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The Case of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche (Human Rights Watch)

The Case | Who is T.D Rinpoche? | The Conspiracy Theory | The Future of T.D Rinpoche

 

The Case:


If questioned, a Chinese government official would not say that Tenzin Delek Rinpoche lived in Tibet. For Chinese authorities and most ethnic Chinese speakers in China, the term Tibet is reserved for the Tibet Autonomous Region, the part of the Tibetan plateau over which the Dalai Lama ruled at the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Tibetans, on the other hand, often use the term to refer to a larger, Tibetan area which includes the TAR and Tibetan areas in four neighboring provinces, the northeastern part of which they refer to as Amdo and the eastern and southeastern part as Kham. China recognises most of the Tibetan-inhabited areas as Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures or Tibetan Autonomous Counties, but by no means regards them as part of Tibet. Most of the Tibetan areas in Sichuan are parts of what Tibetans call Kham. Inhabitants of the area, such as Tenzin Delek, are known as Khampas.

More than 50 percent of ethnic Tibetans live outside the TAR in so-called autonomous prefectures and counties created by the Chinese government after 1949 and assigned to the jurisdiction of one of four provinces: Qinghai, Yunnan, Gansu, and Sichuan. This dispersal of Tibetan population clusters over four provinces is related less to geography and more to history and to a deliberate government attempt to make it administratively harder for Tibetans to organise or act as a single community. | top

Prior to 1949, warlords and officials loosely associated with the Republic of China (familiarly referred to as the Guomindang or the nationalists) ruled the eastern areas, parts of which had been severed up to 300 years earlier from the Dalai Lama's jurisdiction. Almost immediately after securing control of China in 1949, PRC leaders sent troops into eastern Tibet. A year later, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces entered central Tibet, the area the Chinese government renamed the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1965. Tibetans call the incursion an "invasion"; the Chinese refer to it as the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet.

After PLA forces entered Tibetan areas in the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau in 1949, the new PRC government implemented a series of policy changes that led to massive Tibetan resistance and a ten-year period of instability and intermittent warfare in all Tibetan areas. Lithang, Tenzin Delek's home base, was the early epicenter. Open revolt against Chinese policies began there in the mid-1950s and, by all accounts, was brutally suppressed by Chinese forces intent on radically changing Tibetan social and economic structures and on enlisting local leaders' cooperation in furthering so-called reforms.7 In 1959, in Lhasa, the seat of the Dalai Lama's government, Chinese forces quashed the most serious in a string of uprisings. The Dalai Lama and some 100,000 Tibetans fled to India. Tibet and Tibetan areas were then sealed off to outsiders and radical social reforms, including vigorous restrictions on religion, were implemented throughout the area. In Kardze as in other Tibetan areas, stories about psychological humiliation, loss of livelihood, decimation of religious institutions, inhumane prison conditions, wholesale slaughter, starvation, and execution of family members in the 1950s, and then again during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60)9 and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), fueled resentment directed at Chinese officials and China's Tibet policies. | top

By 1979, it had become clear that the new policies were not working, and that the harsh retaliatory measures meted out to those who refused to comply had backfired. Rather than creating divisions among Tibetan social classes, as had been expected, government tactics amplified Tibetan identification. During a visit by then premier Hu Yaobang to the TAR in May 1980 with a Working Group of the (Chinese Communist) Party Central Committee, the government partially reversed course. It agreed to consult and cooperate with regional authorities, apologised for earlier errors, and ordered a large number of Chinese cadres to be removed so that local Tibetans could take over their positions. In a speech at the end of the stay, Hu recommended permitting Tibetans the same "system of private economy" already in place in many other areas.10 In addition, he implied eventual exercise of full autonomy for Tibetans and the development of Tibetan education, culture, and science. In theory, a 1984 national law, the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions," furthered the new policy.11 It promised so-called autonomous minority regions, such as the TAR, prefectures such as Kardze, and certain counties, a degree of control over their economic, social, and cultural development. However, in the almost twenty years since the law took effect, the Chinese leadership has ensured that autonomy in these areas has remained extremely limited. At the same time, China has taken steps to diminish the influence of traditional religion and culture among Tibetans. In addition, it has moved aggressively to "sinicise" Tibetan areas. Tenzin Delek's prestige and the growth of the monastic community he led, as detailed below, appear to have been viewed as obstacles to this process and as unacceptable displays of distinctive cultural identity. A series of large-scale political protests in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, in 1987-89,12 followed in 1993 by populist economic protests there and the spread of political protest to the countryside,13 played a role in another reversal of course. In 1994, at a meeting called the Third National Forum on Work in Tibet (Third Forum), central Chinese leaders agreed on a program of accelerated economic development and approved a policy that curtailed civil and political rights. There were to be new restrictions on religious activities and monastic independence, efforts to curtail the Dalai Lama's political and religious influence took on a new intensity, and a patriotic (Chinese) education campaign in schools and monasteries began. Taken together, the new policies aimed to eradicate the burgeoning Tibetan independence movement and to encourage migration of ethnic Han Chinese to Tibetan areas. | top

Who Is Tenzin Delek Rinpoche?


Tenzin Delek was born in 1950 in Kham, the eastern portion of the Tibetan plateau. His name at birth was A-ngag Tashi. In spite of the chaos surrounding the Chinese incursion into Tibetan areas in the 1950s and the ban on all religious expression during the Cultural Revolution, he managed to study Buddhism. During the 1970s, as conditions permitted, he worked to protect and reestablish Tibetan Buddhism in his home region.

From 1982 to 1987 Tenzin Delek was in India, where the Dalai Lama recognised him as a tulku (reincarnated lama). His time in India may have alarmed Chinese officials, partly because the title greatly enhanced his prestige and even his power within the local community. According to supporters, he left home without official permission or travel documents in 1982, in part to further his own education and, in part, because he feared arrest even then. | top

Tenzin Delek's return in 1987 marked the beginning of a period during which he reportedly was able to bring to fruition many of his proposals for new monasteries, small schools, medical clinics, an orphanage, and old-age homes. It is unclear whether Tenzin Delek received official permission to establish or run these facilities, another possible cause for alarm among local officials. One of his major projects, begun within two years of his return, was the construction of a permanent monastic structure at the summer site of Geden Tashi Dargyeling monastery, an important religious site in Orthok named Kham Nalendra Thegchen Jangchub Choeling, but usually referred to simply as Orthok monastery, it was the largest single institution that Tenzin Delek founded and served as the core of his growing network of monks, activists, and branch monasteries.

In 1998, Tenzin Delek established a school in a place known as Geshe Lungpa in Nyagchu county for some 350 orphans and children from poor families. Another school, established in the early 1990s on the site of Orthok monastery, served some 160 students, including orphans and impoverished youngsters. By providing food and shelter as well as an education, Tenzin Delek was able to obtain the agreement of parents, who might otherwise have been reluctant or too poor to send their children to school. Schools such as these, connected to monasteries, often emphasised religious and traditional learning at the expense of a state-mandated curriculum. It is not clear if either school had been licensed to operate. Tenzin Delek also helped to bring medical facilities to underserved areas. A clinic in Orthok monastery specialising in Tibetan medicine served the local community. Another in Nyagchukha, provided a similar service. A Chinese official has acknowledged Tenzin Delek's beneficial medical work in his local area. However, a planned settlement to shelter nomads during winter, for which Tenzin Delek had allocated funds and purchased materials, was never built after local officials objected. The investment could not be recouped. | top

Over the years, as Tenzin Delek's activities in the Nyagchukha area led to his rise to prominence, local government officials took increased notice of his activities and views. Many were not in line with local government policies and thus could have been seen as challenges to the authority and influence of local officials. Tenzin Delek was an advocate for the social, cultural, economic, and religious rights of local residents. For example, he challenged officials who indiscriminately backed deforestation projects at the expense of local communities. He was willing to confront officials who put what he considered their own interests before those of their constituents. He took a public position on harmful environmental practices in the area and expressed views that had been outlawed by the central government and that local officials had been ordered to eliminate, such as loyalty to the Dalai Lama and other forbidden religious ideas.

Furthermore, it appears that a significant portion of local residents trusted Tenzin Delek, rather than district cadres, to solve communal problems fairly and efficaciously, in part because of his willingness to approach provincial and central government officials when local efforts failed. The use of locally respected lamas as mediators in conflicts is a traditional practice in Tibetan communities and in many places continues to be encouraged by Chinese officials, with the implicit or explicit understanding that such lamas not oppose local or national policies. At some point, however, Tenzin Delek must have crossed the line. According to local sources, the major turning point in Tenzin Delek's relationships with local officials came in 1993, when he worked — successfully — to help roll back an attempt to extend clear-cutting to forest land that residents saw as "belonging" to them. According to community members, those officials never forgave Tenzin Delek for their loss of face over the issue.

Residents argued it was this insult that inspired plans to detain Tenzin Delek in 1997-98 and in 2000. Pressure from Beijing on local authorities to curb what Beijing saw as his politically unacceptable activities most likely also played a role. He was finally arrested in 2002. Knowledgeable informants maintain that local authorities were irritated at Tenzin Delek's personal influence and at monastic rather than lay influence in general. They apparently resented his contention that some officials and some lamas neglected the social and economic needs of the populace to seek out higher salaries and increased privileges for themselves. | top

The Conspiracy Theory:


On April 3, 2002, a bomb, described as a "simple fuse device," exploded in Tianfu Square in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province in China's southwest. It was this bomb that led to the arrests of Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup. There was a Xinhua report on January 26, 2003, the day of Lobsang Dondrup's execution, that one person was seriously injured and many others hurt at the time of the blast. Property damage was reported to have exceeded 800,000 renminbi (U.S.$96,400). | top

Other accounts vary as to the identity of the Tianfu Square bomber, how and when he was apprehended, and the nature of his alleged confession. They also include contradictory information regarding the presence or absence of pro-independence leaflets at the blast sites. Without access to official court documents, particularly the procuratorate indictments and the court verdicts, the discrepancies cannot be resolved.

According to conflicting Chinese government accounts, the detonation was the culminating event in either a series of six bombings beginning in 1998 or a series of four beginning in 2001. Quasi-official reports that Lobsang Dondrup and Tenzin Delek "confessed" to direct responsibility for five attacks cannot be reconciled with the lower figure. Other reports put the number of bombings at seven and are inconsistent in reporting where and when they occurred. Details about the other explosions are sketchy and vary as to the sites where the bombings took place and the extent of injuries and property damage. What appears probable is that two explosions occurred in 1998 at Lithang Gonchen monastery, some 300 kilometers west of Chengdu. They took place near the living quarters of one or possibly two high-ranking lamas, one of whom was a prominent Sichuan provincial official. One of the two made offerings to Dorje Shugden, a deity whose worship the Dalai Lama strongly advised be stopped. Tenzin Delek had actively campaigned in the area to promote the Dalai Lama's view. After official accounts alleged that handwritten leaflets were found at that site, security officers detained a number of Tibetans, including local monks, in order to check their handwriting. | top

Some accounts report a third explosion in 1999 near the Lithang County government office. At least two people suspected of involvement were detained but never tried. Another two or three bombs went off in Dartsedo (Kangding in Chinese), the Kardze prefectural capital, in 2001. According to an official account, the most serious occurred on October 3, 2001 at an office building of the traffic police. One person, a "watchman" died and monetary damages amounted to 290,000 renminbi (U.S.$35,000). Tenzin Delek reportedly was not charged with responsibility for that incident. Lobsang Dondrup was. If this last account is accurate, it suggests that Lobsang Dondrup might have been charged in connection with six incidents. Another account implies that Tenzin Delek was charged in connection with only four bombings and Lobsang Dondrup with five. Accounts are consistent in reporting that a bomb went off at a bridge in Dartsedo in January 2001. The third 2001 bomb is variously reported as having occurred at Party headquarters, government offices, or an official guesthouse. According to an account that located the incident at the prefectural offices in Dartsedo, it resulted in two injuries, one of which was "serious," and extensive damage to the building and to vehicles parked in the compound.35 The probable date is August 2001. An account that located the explosion at the main gate of Party headquarters said that for several weeks the area immediately surrounding the gate was covered with tarpaulins, that traffic had to be diverted, and that the explosion blew out the windows of buildings opposite the site. Both Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup were charged in connection with that incident.

After the Chengdu bombing, the count stood minimally at seven and possibly as many as ten bombings. There is no known evidence other than Lobsang Dondrup's alleged confession to connect the incidents. | top

Future of Tenzin Delek:


The conspicuous absence of a public outcry in Tenzin Delek's home community after his 2002 arrest was in stark contrast to his earlier support. Government officials attributed the public's silence to their coming to terms with his alleged deceptions. His supporters spoke of fear and intimidation. Said one supporter: "It looks as if they were planning this all along. They deployed soldiers; they collected people's guns, even from people in the area who had licenses. The ones the Chinese thought were courageous, that would stand up to them, they went to jail for at least a couple of weeks. They had to shave their heads. It happened to a relative of mine." Wang Lixiong, one of the few outsiders who went to Lithang after Tenzin Delek's 2002 arrest, found no "masses" willing to risk petitioning on Tenzin Delek's behalf. In fact, he was warned, "If you're outside asking about [Tenzin Delek's] situation, it won't be long before there are police at your door." For many years local, prefectural, and provincial officials violated the human rights of Tenzin Delek, his supporters, and the communities in which he lived and worked. They refused Tenzin Delek the right to travel freely within China; they limited his right to meet with his supporters; they controlled the messages he was permitted to deliver to his constituents; they severely compromised his freedom of conscience and right to support his beliefs with meaningful religious activities; and they made a mockery of adherence to international rule of law standards. | top

At no time during the legal proceedings did the Sichuan judiciary and local Kardze Tibet Autonomous Prefecture courts act independently. At no time was evidence — instead of official reiterations of the charges against all the defendants — made public. The trial was not open to the public or observers. There was no presumption of innocence, no independent counsel, no meaningful appeal process. Because both Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup were held incommunicado, there is no way of knowing whether they had access to meaningful legal counsel at any time during the trial and appeals process. With information obtained under torture still regularly introduced as evidence in China, suspicions that "confessions" were coerced and then entered into evidence remain plausible.

The account of how officials responded to Tenzin Delek's religious and social activities in the years preceding his arrest appears to exemplify more widespread efforts on the part of the Chinese leadership to undermine religious leadership in all Tibetan areas. Until 1995, no senior Tibetan lamas had been accused of political dissent. In some respects, the Kardze TAP, where monastic influence remained strong during the post-Cultural Revolution period and into the 1990s, was late to experience a crackdown; the events documented here strongly suggest that it is in the midst of one. It would not be surprising in coming months and years if government officials targeted other influential religious leaders in western Sichuan. Monastic leaders who still refuse to renounce the Dalai Lama, refuse to curb efforts to expand their Buddhist communities, and continue to fill social and cultural communal needs, might yet be targeted for "patriotic education." | top

Both under its own constitution and laws and as a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, China has clear obligations to bring its laws and practices into conformity with international standards. The international community should continue to insist that China do so and hold Chinese leaders publicly and privately accountable for any failures. Chinese officials should begin by freeing Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, as well as Tashi Phuntsog and Taphel. They should receive compensation for their time in detention and any physical or psychological harm they experienced, as should others, now released, who experienced similar problems. Central government authorities should identify and remove officials responsible for the Tenzin Delek affair, and conduct an independent investigation. And whatever one's views on Tibetan independence — Human Rights Watch takes no position on this issue — restrictions on support for the Dalai Lama and other active lamas like Tenzin Delek must end. Tibetans must be able to worship as they wish and support whom they want. These are basic freedoms that no state is entitled to compromise.

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